Great idea! Let bank owners bear losses

File this under: Why didn’t I think of this before?

Oct. 23 (Bloomberg) — Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke called on Congress to ensure that the costs of closing down large financial institutions are borne by the industry, not taxpayers.

The Fed chairman called for a “credible process” for imposing losses on the shareholders and creditors, saying “any resolution costs incurred by the government should be paid through an assessment on the financial industry.”

via Bernanke Says Financial Firms Should Pay for Closings (Update1) – Bloomberg.com.

And don’t forget to let the industry pick up the tab for bailouts, not just shut-downs.

Higher taxes would choke recovery (update)

One year later we have the received narrative for the market crack-up of 2008: Exhibit A – The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers.

And now we know what saved the economy: Exhibit B — Massive liquidity from the Federal Reserve — in contrast to the Great Depression era central bankers who put the squeeze on monetary policy.

Okay. Let’s poke a few holes.

The Lehman bankruptcy, whose anniversary we have been celebrating for the past month, was certainly no heart-warming event. But it wasn’t the straw that broke the camel’s back. University of Chicago economists John H. Cochrane and Luigi Zingales demonstrate that the economy didn’t hit the panic button until former Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson and Fed Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke went to Capitol Hill and yelled “Fire!”

concern turns to panic

When Paulson and Bernanke speak, the markets panic

Notice in the graphic (above) that a critical measure of confidence in the banking system — the Libor -OIS spread — didn’t really begin rising to record levels until after Paulson and Bernanke went before Congress to argue for the TARP legislation, which they said was needed to keep the economy from collapsing. Similarly, the price of insurance on Citibank bonds (aka, credit default swaps) didn’t jump to Olympian heights after the Lehman bankruptcy; it was only after the mouths roared before Congress. In general, my experience in  covering the market reveals that this is typical. Politics is more often than not the catalyst that roils the markets big time. And credit markets are the leading indicator. That was true in 1987 and it was true in 2008.

Next: Tight money killed the incipient recovery in the 1930s. Economist Arthur B. Laffer begs to differ:

The damage caused by high taxation during the Great Depression is the real lesson we should learn. A government simply cannot tax a country into prosperity. If there were one warning I’d give to all who will listen, it is that U.S. federal and state tax policies are on an economic crash trajectory today just as they were in the 1930s.

via Arthur B. Laffer: Taxes, Depression, and Our Current Troubles – WSJ.com.

And, of course, here’s a graphic to show what happened to just the top federal tax rates during the Depression projected through to 2015. Note: this does not include rising city, state or sales taxes.

top tax rates

I am no big fan of big deficits (and both the NYTimes and Clusterstock both ran pieces similar to mine last week on the dangers of our deep debt hole — Clusterstock featured the same graphic). But now is not the time to raise taxes to either fund new programs or whittle our mountain of debt.

More from Laffer on the tax hikes that began in the Hoover Administration and continued during the Roosevelt years: Continue reading

No ovation for this Obameration on Wall Street

Barack Obama

Image via Wikipedia

I thumbed through my old edition of Wheelock’s Latin grammar this afternoon to see if I could find the correct conjugation for the verb ‘Obamere‘, which roughly translates as ‘to Obamerate,’ i.e., to deliver a speech full of eloquence and sleights of tongue; to leave the listener wondering — was it only fairy dust?

Today’s call to financial arms was the quintessential Obameration. As he stood in Federal Hall, site of the inauguration of George Washington, Obama was both heroic and elegiac: Fie! to the Wall Street bankers who needed taxpayer money; woe! to switch-and-bait mortgage lenders; shame! to the unnamed borrower who asked for more than he could truly manage (that’s you Edmund Andrews). Never again will the the United States of America allow so few to hurt so many. In other words, Obama had nothing to new to say. But I loved the structure of the speech and the omissions.

There was barely a ‘tsk, tsk’ to the regulators who missed it all. He urged almost every other player to take full responsibility for their actions (a very good thing), but in essence he said the regulators were largely to be pitied. And here is the heart of an Obameration, which allows our president to re-arrange the alphabet into words that soar so that if we blink, we miss the real import of his message: Those who were asleep during the years that bankers and borrowers amassed life-threatening amounts of risk shall gain more power. Here’s my favorite part of the speech (emphasis added):

…we’ve got to close the loopholes that were at the heart of the crisis. Where there were gaps in the rules, regulators lacked the authority to take action. Where there were overlaps, regulators often lacked accountability for inaction.  These weaknesses in oversight engendered systematic, and systemic, abuse.

Under existing rules, some companies can actually shop for the regulator of their choice – and others, like hedge funds, can operate outside of the regulatory system altogether. We’ve seen the development of financial instruments, like derivatives and credit default swaps, without anyone examining the risks or regulating all of the players. And we’ve seen lenders profit by providing loans to borrowers who they knew would never repay, because the lender offloaded the loan and the consequences to someone else. Those who refuse to game the system are at a disadvantage.

Let’s take a closer look at just this section of the speech:

Regulators lacked the authority to take action. That is a myth of the first order. The real issue is something known as ‘regulator capture’– the people entrusted to police Wall Street operated like minions. Think SEC and Bernie Madoff and you get a pretty good picture of what was really going on in the last decade. The power the regulators had they didn’t use. The regulators who urged more vigilance and greater independence from Wall Street — FDIC chair Sheila Bair and Brooksley Born —  weren’t even in attendance.

Regulators often lacked accountability for inaction. I wonder if this quick little slap made White House economics advisor Larry Summers and US Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner — who were invited to the speech — squirm. I believe that would be the former president of  the New York Federal Reserve who somehow said in his confirmation hearings that he wasn’t actually a regulator; Summers, of course, was part of the Clinton Administration urging critical changes that enabled many of today’s problems.

And others, like hedge funds, can operate outside of the regulatory system. Excuse me, but I don’t recall anyone bailing out any hedge funds — except for Long Term Capital Management during the Russian ruble crisis ten years ago. This line resonated for a bit on Twitter.

And we’ve seen lenders profit by providing loans to borrowers who they knew would never repay. Now that’s what I call a segue: from powerless regulators who clearly would have done something if they had only been able to see the forest for the trees (as Obama later explains was the real problem) to hedge funds (which the White House now needs to invest in toxic assets) to sleazy mortgage lenders.

And there, you have it, dear readers, the Obameration.

For those of you interested in true regulatory reform, I refer you to another speech also delivered today by Jeff Lacker, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond (h/t @bobbrinker). It take s a much more serious look at the real roots of the market blow-up and offers suggestions that won’t be popular.

Also of greater note today is an interview on CNBC with Rep. Barney Frank. I wondered if the White House crowd wasn’t ticked with Frank, who actually said something worth noting ahead of today’s Obameration. He asserted that Congress has got to do something to de-fang the credit rating agencies, lead players in the market mess. The agencies, of course, didn’t merit mention in today’s Obameration (and no one from the three biggies were in attendance to hear the speech in person); and so far, they’ve avoided any slap-down in power from the SEC. But who knows, maybe change is really afoot.

Avete atque valete.

The real reason Uncle Ben almost never smiles: a graphic story (part 1)

He got the job he wants. The stock market is up more than 50% from its lows. Confidence is up. Even home prices have improved. And yet, why isn’t our favorite central banker smiling?

Take a look at the graphic below from dshort.com comparing the S&P500 during three historic jolts to the economy and you’ll get a sense of just why: From a technical standpoint we are on the knife’s edge of hope and peril.

The gray line shows the roller coaster ride investors endured over the first two years of the Great Depression. A big plunge. Then a ride to the moon (nearly 50% higher) and ka-boom, a big jolt down that landed the market 75% lower nearly two years later. It was a classic, secular bear market: a sucker’s rally followed by the falling knife.

The red and green lines tell very different stories and follow two previous shocks to our economic system: the oil crisis of the early 70s and the tech market bust of the early aughts. Their paths are the yellow-brick-road of recovery — a little scary at moments but basically a happy tale.

That brings us to the blue line — the story unfolding before our very eyes. First, the stomach churning plunge (have our teeth stopped chattering yet from the post-Lehman bankruptcy death spiral last year?). And then, starting in March, the tidal wave of optimism which has put the S&P500 more than 50% above its March low, and much more quickly than during the recovery periods of 1974 and 2002.

Doug Short, a retired English professor turned market seer, asks the obvious question about the current rally: “Will it continue to show resilience?”

In future posts, I’ll tell the bullish story on the Great Rally of the Great Recession — though I confess I’m skeptical of those numbers. Then I’ll put forward the secular bear market narrative. Be forewarned: The stories will be graphic.

road-to-recovery-large

You want bonuses? Pay the invaluable ones in AIG stock

American International Group, Inc.

Image via Wikipedia

Do you think Obama lost the little sticky note on his desk that said: Do something about the AIG bonus payments due on July 15?

Maybe the computer hackers in North Korea wiped out the Outlook calendar pop-up that would have reminded Kenneth R. Feinberg, the financial bonus czar, to manage the AIG p.r. bonus problem.

Or maybe someone in Barney Frank’s office devilishly tinkered with the White House tickler system so the congressman could appear before TV cameras all flushed and outraged about a company that has received $180,000,000,000 in taxpayer money paying $2,400,000 to its 40 top-ranking executives — about $600,000 per person.

In case you’ve missed the news, AIG is asking the White House for permission to pay its top executives bonsues — as contractually agreed — on July 15. I can only guess that the the White House will pretend to be surprised that AIG is asking for its blessing. But if you emasculate a company, then put it on life support with a tube running directly into the Executive Branch of government, what can you expect? Considered, independent judgment?

It’s really too bad that no one had the nerve last fall to put AIG out of its misery and into receivership, which Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke told Congress earlier this year would have been a very good option.  Then no one in the Administration would be forced to mumble something about how these contracts really, really count (no do-overs, except when it comes to handing out more and more $$$$) as opposed to the contracts that don’t count because when you’re about to go out of business and everything and anything should be up for negotiation. Now we’re stuck thinking once more about AIG, what a mess it is, and this whole bonus thing. Doesn’t everyone realize that it’s summer and we should be on the beach thinking about the little green shoots (aren’t they darling?) and how the world isn’t coming to an end after all? I feel like we just opened a national report card and the news is really bad. Summer school for everyone! The curriculum is brutal: wall-to-wall AIG with an emphasis on bonuses and the evils of Wall Street. First, we’ll be forced to review all the newspapers that wrote about those nasty bonuses; then we’ll read the bloggers; and if we still don’t get it, we’ll be forced to watch reruns of everyone shouting at one another on CNBC in surround sound.

I promise, next time round, to learn my lesson. But perhaps we can all avoid summer school by coming up with a solution to the AIG bonus problem. And believe it or not, I think I have it. Pay the bonuses in AIG stock. If these top guns think they can bring the company from the brink of oblivion, then they will welcome the opportunity for skin in the game. But if they secretly agree with Citigroup analyst Joshua Shanker, then they’ll be putting up their houses for sale. On Thursday, Shanker wrote that AIG stock has a 70% chance of going to zero, as in nada. Nothing. “That reflects the risk of further losses on credit-default swaps and the company’s increased willingness to sell businesses at low valuations, Shanker explained.”

Them’s fightin’ words. AIG stock slumped 21% after Shanker’s report made the rounds.

I say to the top execs of AIG, if you want to let Shanker know he’s wrong, then vow to take your bonuses in stock. Stand tall. Stand proud. And if you do a really good job — as in returning every last penny of American taxpayer money before my hair turns gray — you won’t ever have to ask the White House again for another compensation blessing.

Now, please, let us all return to our regularly scheduled vacation stupor.